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INTRODUCTION: DREAMS IN CLINICAL
PSYCHIATRY
Throughout most of the 20th century,
dreaming was considered at the center of
the leading psychotherapeutic approaches
to mental disorders. Psychodynamic mod-
els of the mind stemmed from Sigmund
Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams, accord-
ing to which knowledge of the uncon-
scious foundations of most symptoms
could be enhanced by an accurate evalua-
tion of reported dreams. Toward the end
of the century, these conceptualizations
were challenged by a progressive shift of
perspective in the direction of neurobio-
logically informed, mechanistic models of
brain dysfunction. The diffusion of effec-
tive psychotropic medications developed
to target specific symptoms across differ-
ent disorders contributed to the requal-
ification of psychiatry itself within the
broader domain of medical sciences. A
whole generation of psychiatrists turned
to biology as a more scientific, rigor-
ous and reliable framework to understand
mental disorders. In parallel, new psycho-
logical techniques began to emerge that
aimed to treat symptoms more directly
by addressing dysfunctional cognitive con-
structs, leading to a relative weakening of
the psychodynamic paradigm that is now
considered one of several possible mod-
els in need of a neuroscientific valida-
tion. Neuroscience itself is largely based
on cognitive psychology given the major
simplicity of its theories in comparison to
psychodynamic models, so that neurobi-
ological research paradigms in psychiatry
aim to define neural substrates of cogni-
tive mechanisms that differ from the norm
(Fusar-Poli and Broome, 2006).
In line with this progression of sci-
entific thought, modern dream research
in psychiatry focuses on abnormalities
of manifest dream content that can be
found within different disorders. Although
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
is the only condition within which spe-
cific abnormalities of dream content are
considered by clinicians in the diagnos-
tic process—and become a specific target
of treatment—several studies have shown
that abnormal, disorder-specific dreams
are reported by most subjects diagnosed
with a mental disorder (Beauchemin and
Hays, 1995; Sauteraud and Menny, 1997;
Schredl and Engelhardt, 2001; Cartwright
et al., 2006; Lusignan et al., 2009).
Although several hypotheses on the rela-
tionship between dream and waking expe-
riences have been proposed, some of which
based on the known abnormalities of sleep
rhythms and architecture that occur in
psychiatric disorders, no definitive conclu-
sion can be drawn. This difficulty relates
to a poor understanding of mechanistic
links between psychiatric diagnoses, sleep
abnormalities, and chronobiological dis-
ruptions that have been recognized and
studied for many decades (Wulff et al.,
2010).
In this opinion article, we will pro-
pose that the progressive refinement of
our understanding of dream conscious-
ness could foster significant advances for
neuroscience and psychiatry as a whole.
THE DREAM STATE: CONTRIBUTION TO
A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE
BRAIN/MIND
Several peculiarities of dreaming make
this state a candidate for the experimental
study of the brain/mind relationship, a
central issue for any possible concep-
tualization of psychiatric disorders. In
recent years, several academics exposed
the limits of an excessively operational-
ized coding system for psychiatric diag-
noses (Andreasen, 2007; Craddock and
Owen, 2010; Maj, 2011). Structured diag-
nostic interviews and symptom checklists
are known to overestimate comorbidity
and often fail to shed light on the core
disturbance which causes clinically rele-
vant deterioration of mental health (Maj,
2005). Aside from the obvious behav-
ioral abnormalities that can be observed in
some prototypical forms of major disor-
ders, the vast majority of diagnoses depend
on clinicians’ evaluation of thoughts, per-
cepts, emotions and actions reported by
patients. The complexity of these experi-
ences contributes to the construction of a
“pathological self” that tends to vary con-
siderably across individuals. In this view,
failure to obtain reliable biological markers
of any psychiatric disorder could depend
on the lack of a clear understanding of
the cerebral constituents of the most basic
integrative processes that lead to a con-
scious self in healthy subjects. Although
important progress has been made in the
fields of neuroimaging and neurophysiol-
ogy, the question of how any human brain
can generate and integrate a self remains
elusive and largely open to speculation
(Metzinger and Gallese, 2003; Northoff
and Bermpohl, 2004; Tononi, 2012).
In this framework, dreaming repre-
sents a unique state of consciousness gen-
erated when the brain is activated as a
closed system, detached from the environ-
ment. The dreamer is asleep and unaware
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of his/her surroundings but develops a
full state of consciousness associated with
a multimodal reconstruction of dynamic
scenes, emotions and interactions with
other dreamed people or objects. This
is the only physiological, spontaneously
recurring state in which complex sub-
jective experiences depend almost exclu-
sively on information stored within the
brain. For this reason, dreaming is said to
reveal consciousness itself “in a very spe-
cial, pure, and isolated form” (Revonsuo,
2006).
One relevant limitation to dream
research, is the observer’s reliance on ver-
bal reports produced by the dreamer upon
awakening. As occurs in the context of
psychiatric interviews, external observers
cannot access the content of subjective
experiences directly, but only attempt to
reconstruct them on the basis of a narra-
tive. However, the decoding of stimulus-
and task-induced brain activity patterns to
display visual experiences has already been
applied to sleep-onset reports and is likely
to be used on complete REM reports in
the near future (Horikawa et al., 2013).
THE SEARCH FOR A MINIMAL SELF
The dream self has been described to
largely overlap the core features of the
waking self, given its full embodiment
and its spatial localization within most
of the dream environments (Revonsuo,
2006). Most dream reports involve the
presence of a dream self around which
the dream itself develops. Indeed, “self-
less” dreams are exceedingly rare reports
of disembodied centers of awareness that
generally occur during Slow Wave Sleep
(SWS) (Occhionero et al., 2005). The vast
majority of reports suggest that the dream-
ing brain creates a complex, multimodal
hallucinatory reality within which the self
is immersed. This hallucinatory immer-
sion has also been recently described as
only partially embodied, given the low
recurrence of most bodily sensations in
dream reports (Windt, 2010). In this state
of the brain/mind, self-referential process-
ing is weakened, so that contemporary
researchers suggest the search for neuro-
functional correlates of what they define as
“impoverished selfhood” could by contrast
help to clarify the substrate of a mini-
mal self in humans (Blanke andMetzinger,
2009). Such term is used to describe the
conscious experience of an embodied sub-
ject who is spatially immersed within
a first-person perspective. The dream
state retains this form of “primary con-
sciousness” associated with an impover-
ishment of higher order language-related
faculties such as self-reflective awareness,
abstract thinking, volition, and metacog-
nition termed “secondary consciousness”
(Edelman, 1992; Hobson, 2009).
One of the major differences between
dreaming and being awake lies in the sub-
ject’s preserved ability to distinguish real
and internally fabricated images only in
the latter state of consciousness. Although
every human’s life is characterized by
the brain’s continuous distinction between
these two modalities, this type of self-
reflective ability is only expressed dur-
ing standard wakefulness. Lucid dream-
ing and anoneirognosis—two rare con-
ditions that have only marginally been
characterized in terms of underlying
neurobiology—should be considered rel-
evant exceptions with a potential for sci-
entific advancement of knowledge in this
field. Table 1 summarizes the major dif-
ferences between normal dreaming, lucid
dreaming and anoneirognosis. Whereas
lucidity is a physiological condition in
which the dreamer acquires secondary
consciousness within the dream (Hobson,
2009), anoneirognosis is a clinical syn-
drome of dream-reality confusion associ-
ated with defective reality monitoring and
executive disorders (Solms, 1997). Both
conditions can be interpreted as disso-
ciated REM phenomena, with the latter
possibly matching a state of pre-lucidity
within which the dream self is doubt-
ful over the origin of the experience.
Dissociated phenomena can be under-
stood in terms of intermediate states of
consciousness in Allan Hobson’s AIM state
space model. Advantages of this model
for the conceptualization of physiologi-
cal and pathological transitions of con-
sciousness across the sleep-wake cycle have
been discussed elsewhere (D’Agostino and
Limosani, 2009).
DREAMS AND PSYCHOSIS: FROM
PHENOMENOLOGY TO
NEUROPHYSIOLOGY
The similarity between dreams and psy-
chosis has been described by observers
belonging to countless philosophical and
scientific periods, at least since classical
antiquity. Whereas most recent concep-
tualizations of such analogy attempted
to transfer knowledge from the neuro-
biology of dream sleep to the neuro-
science of psychotic disorders (Hobson,
2004; Gottesmann, 2006; D’Agostino et al.,
2012), it seems reasonable at the current
state of knowledge to consider research in
each of the fields could reciprocally con-
tribute to the other (Windt and Noreika,
2011).
The core similarity between these two
conditions lies in the subject’s inabil-
ity to discern self-generated from non-
self-generated percepts. Indeed, psychotic
patients experience hallucinations and
construct complex delusional beliefs that
grossly impair their social adaptation,
without recognizing the internal origin of
their experiences. This so-called lack of
insight defines the nature of psychosis and
persists no matter how bizarre the verbal-
ized experience may appear to an external
observer. Likewise, the dreaming subject
uncritically accepts the most incongru-
ous and discontinuous twists and turns of
the dream plot without ever developing
doubts over the nature of his/her experi-
ence.
In the prodromal stage of schizophre-
nia, patients present with a pervasive state
of ambivalence and confusion over the
meaning of internal and external stimuli
which usually leads to the emergence of
a unifying delusional explanation. It has
been observed that similar to the experi-
ence of dreaming, “the subject is confined
to his current impressions and perspec-
tive at the present moment” (Uhlhaas and
Mishara, 2007).
In neurophysiological terms, “corollary
discharge” or self-monitoring circuits are
known to discriminate sensations depen-
dent on self-generated motor activity from
those originating in the environment.
According to some authors, such mech-
anisms are deactivated in the dream state
from lower to higher levels of the neu-
raxis, determining the dream self ’s loss of
a “sense of agency” (Feinberg and March,
1995). Intriguingly, research into loss of
the “sense of agency” associated with
hallucinations and delusions led to the
development of dysconnectivity hypothe-
ses of schizophrenia, according to which
disrupted functional connectivity amongst
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Table 1 | Major differences between normal dreaming, lucid dreaming, and anoneirognosis.
Normal dreams Lucid dreams Anoneirognosis
Awareness of one’s
waking self
Absent/Strongly diminished Preserved
The dreamer can communicate with
external observers through
eye-movement protocols memorized
during wakefulness.
Unknown
Awareness of one’s state
(awake/sleep)
Absent
The dreamer is fully convinced of
being awake. The dreamer can refer
to his/her experience as a dream only
upon awakening.
Preserved
The dreamer is aware of being asleep.
The dreamer can recognize his/her
experience as a dream during the
dream itself.
Fluctuating
The subject is often uncertain and fails
to distinguish waking experiences
from dreams.
Volitional behavior Absent/Strongly diminished
The dreamer mostly acts
automatically with no volitional
control.
Partially retained
The dreamer can at times volitionally
control his/her dream.
Unknown
Table 2 | Implications of dream research for psychiatry.
Dream research Psychiatry
Phenomenology Definition of dream self in healthy subjects Epistemological support for a reliable definition of pathological
subjective experiences, beyond operationalized diagnoses
Neurobiology Brain basis of the dream self Brain basis of altered self-experiences in psychiatric conditions
(dissociation, psychosis)
Brain basis of continuous transitions of subjectivity
across the sleep/wake cycle
Brain basis of chronic/acute detachments from reality observed in
different psychotic disorders (Schizophrenia, Delusional Disorder, Brief
Psychotic Episodes, Mood Disorders with Psychotic features,
Substance-related Psychoses)
Brain basis of lucidity Brain basis of self-reflective cognition to define the neural underpinnings
of psychotic patients’ lack of insight
Brain basis of visual and auditory hallucinatory
experiences that occur in dreams
Brain basis of hallucinations that occur in absence of neurological lesions
Pharmacology Effect of different psychotropic drugs on qualitative and
quantitative aspects of dreaming
Neuromodulatory mechanisms underlying specific effects of
psychotropic medications
specialized regions is the core neurobio-
logical substrate of the disorder. Indeed,
inadequate attribution of the origin of self-
produced mental contents could depend
on disrupted connectivity within neural
networks responsible for sensorimotor
integration. Functional neuroimaging
techniques confirmed impaired connec-
tivity between prefrontal and temporal
cortical structures during language-related
tasks and reduced prefrontal activity is
commonly associated with failure of self-
monitoring in these patients (Stephan
et al., 2009). Decreased functional con-
nectivity between brain regions involved
in action initiation and perception of
its sensory consequences has also been
observed in several electroencephalo-
graphic (EEG) studies (Ford et al., 2007).
Similarly, uncoupled EEG activity between
executive and perceptual regions has been
experimentally correlated with dreaming
during REM sleep (Corsi-Cabrera et al.,
2003).
The progression from quiet waking to
sleep onset, NREM, and REM sleep, is
correlated with an increase in vivid, hallu-
cinatory percepts that are bound together
hyperassociatively in bizarre dream expe-
riences. In general, REM dream reports
are narrative reconstructions of what
the dreamer saw, did, felt emotionally
and sometimes thought or said, whereas
dreams reported upon awakening from
other stages of sleep are thought-like and
simple in terms of imagery (Casagrande
et al., 1996). In this respect, REM sleep
represents a privileged window into a
defined neurophysiological state to which
a complex pattern of mental activity
can be associated. EEG and fMRI stud-
ies have shown that the emergence of
self-reflection in lucid dreams is associ-
ated with a reactivation of frontal cor-
tices that are usually inactive during REM
sleep (Voss et al., 2009). The precuneus,
a region involved in self-referential pro-
cessing during wakefulness, was also found
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to be remarkably more active when REM
periods during which lucidity is signaled
are contrasted with adjacent REM periods
(Dresler et al., 2012).
CONCLUSION
Table 2 summarizes some of the most rel-
evant implications of dream research for
psychiatry. The growing knowledge in this
field will enhance our understanding of
how conscious experiences emerge from
the activity of the brain. Clearer definitions
of the neurobiological bases of a minimal
self and of the cerebral underpinnings of
self-reflection will shed light on those con-
ditions within which this physiological fac-
ulty is lost. Whereas most humans lose this
faculty every time they dream and regain
it upon awakening, some develop complex
mental disorders in which the same loss
during wakefulness severely compromises
their relationship with the environment.
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